The Limitation Act, 1963
Section 5: Condonation of Delay
Provision:
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, allows courts to condone (or excuse) delays in filing appeals and applications, as long as the applicant can show “sufficient cause” for not filing within the prescribed period. This section is important because it provides flexibility in cases where, due to unforeseen circumstances, parties could not adhere to the statutory limitation period.
The phrase “sufficient cause” is left open to judicial interpretation, which gives courts discretion to assess each case based on its facts and circumstances. Common reasons courts may consider sufficient for condoning delay include:
- Unforeseen events (such as illness, family emergencies, or natural disasters),
- Incorrect legal advice or mistakes made by legal counsel,
- Bureaucratic delays or procedural challenges, and
- Instances where the applicant acted in good faith but faced unavoidable obstacles.
This provision applies only to appeals and applications (such as petitions), not to suits (lawsuits), which must strictly adhere to limitation periods. Courts are guided by a balance between the principles of justice and the need to prevent undue delay in legal proceedings.
Case Law: Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji (1987)
In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, the Supreme Court of India established a precedent favoring a liberal interpretation of “sufficient cause.” The Court emphasized that technical reasons should not prevent substantial justice and that delays should be condoned more liberally when public interest or fundamental rights are involved. The judgment laid down the following key points:
Liberal Approach: The Court underscored that a liberal approach should be taken when deciding whether to condone a delay. Justice should not be sacrificed for technicality, and substantial justice should be prioritized.
Substantial Justice over Technicalities: